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Summary. A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating
a given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education,
transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when admis-
sible preferences are those representable by continuous and increasing utility
functions, then strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose (undominated)
range contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial on the set of profiles of
strictly increasing utility functions, a dense subset of the domain in the
topologies commonly used in this context. If admissible utility functions are
further restricted to be strictly increasing, or if mechanisms are required to be
non-wasteful, then strategy-profness leads to (full) dictatorship.
JEL Classification Numbers: D60, D70, H40.
1 Introduction
A fundamental problem in public finance is that of deciding how to allocate a
given (limited) budget to financing the provision of public goods (education,
transportation, police, etc.). The purpose of this paper is to characterize the
kinds of institutions, or allocation mechanisms, that can be used to make
these decisions. It is shown that if the preferences of those individuals af-
fected by the decision are to be taken into consideration, then all allocation
mechanisms have very unappealing properties: either they are not compatible
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with individuals’ incentives, or they select outcomes on the basis of the
preferences of a single individual.
The revelation principle has established that the search for incentive
compatible allocation mechanisms can be restricted to those for which each
individual’s strategy space is the set of his possible preferences. An allo-
cation mechanism in this class is a mapping which associates a feasible
outcome with each profile of reported preferences. Since individuals’ pref-
erences are private information, it is conceivable that an individual might
attempt to manipulate a mechanism by reporting false preferences. A
mechanism is strategy-proof if each individual is best o reporting his true
preferences, whatever preferences the other individuals report. Hence
strategy-proof mechanisms are not subject to manipulation by any indi-
vidual.
Whether or not one can design strategy-proof allocation mechanisms that
perform well in other respects depends on the domain of preferences on
which decisions are to be made, as well as on the set of feasible outcomes.
Gibbard [3] and Satterthwaite [10] have shown that when all preferences are
admissible, then all strategy-proof decision mechanisms whose range con-
tains three or more outcomes are dictatorial; i.e., they select outcomes that
maximize the welfare of a single individual (the dictator). Barbera` and Peleg
[2] have established that this result remains valid even if admissible prefer-
ences are restricted to be continuous. (When preferences are known to be
convex as well as continuous, strategy-proof mechanisms with a one
dimensional range were characterized by Moulin [8] as median voter type,
among which there are nondictatorial ones; this characterization has been
generalized recently by Barbera` and Jackson [1]. Zhou [11] has shown that
strategy-proof decision mechanisms whose range contains a two dimensional
set are dictatorial.) In most allocation problems associated with public goods
provision, however, individuals’ preferences are known to be monotonic on
the set of feasible outcomes. Hence these allocation problems are not within
the scope of any of the above mentioned results. (Satiated preferences play
a fundamental role in the proofs of these results.)
In this paper it is investigated which allocation mechanisms are strategy-
proof for a domain of preferences typically associated with public goods
provision; namely, those representable by continuous and increasing utility
functions. The results presented here establish that conclusions similar to
those obtained by Gibbard, Satterthwaite, and Barbera`-Peleg still hold when
admissible preferences are further restricted to be monotonic: It is shown
that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose domain is the set of all the
profiles of continuous and increasing utility functions, and whose (undomi-
nated) range contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial in a sense
weaker than that commonly used in this context; specifically, these mecha-
nisms are dictatorial on the set of profiles of strictly increasing utility func-
tions, rather than on the entire domain. (The cardinality condition imposed
on the mechanism’s range implies that at least two public goods are pro-
vided.)
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Unfortunately, although this conclusion is weaker than those obtained
when satiated preferences are admissible, it is nevertheless very negative: The
subdomain where these mechanisms are shown to be dictatorial (the set of
profiles of strictly increasing utility functions) is a dense subset of the domain
in the topologies commonly used in these contexts. In fact, it is shown that if
a mechanism is non-wasteful (or ecient) as well as strategy-proof, then it
must be (fully) dictatorial. It is also shown that when the set of admissible
utility functions is the set of all the continuous and strictly increasing utility
functions, then only (fully) dictatorial mechanisms are strategy-proof.
2 The model and the results
The set of individuals is N  f1; . . . ; ng; where n  1. For simplicity, each
individual consumption set is taken to be <m. The set of feasible outcomes is
denoted by X ; which is assumed to be a compact subset of <m. Preferences
are represented by utility functions (i.e., real-valued functions on <m). As
individuals’ utility functions might be known a priori to have certain prop-
erties, let U denote the set of admissible utility functions. For u 2 U n and
S  N , u S is the profile obtained from u by deleting the utility functions of
the members of S.
An allocation mechanism (or simply a mechanism) is a mapping
f : U n ! X : A mechanism f is manipulable by Individual i at u 
u i; ui 2 Un if there is u0 2 U such that uif u i; u0 > uif u. A mecha-
nism is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any i 2 N at any u 2 U n. A
mechanism f is dictatorial on X  U n if there is an individual i 2 N such that
for each u 2 X, f u maximizes ui on f X (then Individual i is referred to as
a dictator for f on X). A mechanism f is dictatorial if it is dictatorial on U n
(and a dictator for f on Un is simply referred to as a dictator).
Strategy-proof mechanisms are those for which an individual is always
best o reporting a utility function representing his true preferences. Thus,
when preferences are private information and individuals’ prior beliefs about
the preferences of the other individuals are unknown, as is often the case,
strategy-proofness implies that ‘‘truthful revelation’’ is an ‘‘equilibrium.’’ A
dictatorial mechanism always selects an outcome from the set of maximizers
on the mechanism’s range of the dictator’s reported utility function.
Dictatorial mechanisms are therefore very unsatisfactory as whenever there
is a conflict between the dictator’s and the other individuals’ preferences, the
dictator’s preferences prevail.
There is a large literature investigating the properties of strategy-proof
mechanisms. This literature has generally found that, in certain domains,
strategy-proof mechanisms have very unappealing properties. Of course,
there are trivial mechanisms that are strategy-proof. For example, any
constant mechanism is strategy-proof. Interesting mechanisms, however, are
those that are ‘‘responsive’’ to individuals’ preferences (as measured, for
example, by the size of the mechanism’s range). It is therefore important
to determine the properties of strategy-proof mechanisms. When satiated
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preferences are admissible, Gibbard [3], Satterthwaite [10], and Barbera` and
Peleg [2] have established that only dictatorial mechanisms are strategy-
proof. Barbera` and Peleg establish this result for mechanisms whose domain
contain all the continuous utility functions and whose range contain three or
more outcomes. (When only two outcomes are selected ‘‘majority rule’’ is a
strategy-proof and nondictatorial mechanism.)
These results, however, have no implications for most allocation prob-
lems associated with public goods provision, as it is usually assumed that
individuals’ preferences are monotonic; i.e., only increasing utility functions
are admissible. A utility function u is increasing if for each a; b 2 <m, a > b
(i.e., ak  bk for k  1; . . . ;m and a 6 b) implies u a   u b , and a b (i.e.,
ak > bk for k  1; . . . ;m) implies u a  > u b ; it is strictly increasing if a > b
implies u a  > u b .
Given a set A  <m, write bA for the set a 2 A j 9= a0 2 A : a0 > af g. Thus,
if A  <2, then bA is the northeast boundary of A. Since the domain consid-
ered here contains profiles of utility functions that are increasing, then the
‘‘relevant’’ set of outcomes in the range of a mechanism f is the set dfU n.
(Henceforth this set is referred to as the undominated range of a mechanism).
Thus, a cardinality condition as that imposed in the Barbera`-Peleg Theorem
will be imposed on the undominated range of a mechanism, rather than on
its entire range. Denote by _U the set of admissible utility functions that are
strictly increasing.
Theorem 1 below establishes a result analogous to the Barbera`-Peleg
Theorem when admissible utility functions are restricted to be increasing.
The proof of Theorem 1, and propositions 1 and 2 below, are given in
Section 3.
Theorem 1. Let U be the set of all the continuous increasing utility functions,
and let f : U n ! X be a strategy-proof mechanism such that df Un  contains
three or more outcomes. Then f is dictatorial on _U n.Moreover, if Individual i is
the dictator for f on _Un; then for each u 2 _U n, f u maximizes ui on f U n.
Thus, mechanisms satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1 are dictato-
rial on an important subdomain; namely, the set _U n of profiles of strictly
increasing utility functions. (Note that the set _U is a dense subset of U in the
most commonly used topologies; e.g., the compact-open topology, or the
topology of closed convergence, i.e., the topology on the set of equivalence
classes of U induced by the pseudometric d given for u0; u00 2 U by
d u0; u00   d G u0 ;G u00  , where d is the Hausdor distance, and for
u 2 U ;G u  is the set x; y  2 <m  <m j u x   u y 
 	
-see Hildenbrand [4].)
Moreover, on this subdomain mechanisms must select the dictator’s most
preferred outcome on the entire range. Also note that the condition imposed
in Theorem 1 on the cardinality of the set df Un  eectively requires that at
least two public goods be provided. (If X  <, then for any A  X ; bA is
a singleton.)
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The conclusion of Theorem 1 is weaker than that obtained by Barbera`-
Peleg, but as Example 1 shows a dictator on _U n need not be a full dictator.
Example 1. There are three public goods, and the set of feasible outcomes is
X  x 2 <3 j x1  x2  x3  1
 	
. Let f : U n ! X be given for each u 2 Un
by f u  0; 0; 0 if u2  u2, where u2 x   x1x2x3, for x 2 <3; otherwise let
f u be some arbitrary maximizer of u1 on 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1f g.
This mechanism is strategy-proof: Clearly Individual 1 cannot manipu-
late as he gets one of his best outcomes (on the mechanism’s range) whenever
Individual 2 does not declare u2, and otherwise the utility function he reports
does not aect the outcome. Individual 2 cannot manipulate either: If his
preferences are represented by u2, then he is indierent between the outcome
the mechanism selects when he reports u2, and all the other outcomes in the
range of the mechanism; and if the mechanism selects any other outcome, he
can only induce 0; 0; 0 , which can never make him better o. Individuals
3; . . . ; n cannot manipulate either as the utility functions they report do not
aect the outcome. Moreover, the set df Un   bX satisfies the cardinality
condition imposed on Theorem 1. Thus, if U is the set of all the continuous
increasing utility functions, then f satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1. Of
course, this mechanism is dictatorial on _U n, but it is not (fully) dictatorial.
Under this mechanism Individual 2 never benefits when Individual 1 (the
dictator for f on _Un) does not get his most preferred outcome. In fact, as
Lemma 11 of Section 3 shows, under the assumptions of Theorem 1 the
maximizer of the dictator’s (for f on _Un reported utility function imposes an
upper bound to the bundle the mechanism selects. Thus, every mechanism f
which is dictatorial on _Un, but which is not fully dictatorial, is wasteful (i.e.,
it does not always exhaust the existing resources); moreover, it is also inef-
ficient as whenever the dictator for f on _U n does not get one of his most
preferred outcomes, it is possible to make him better o without making
anybody else worse o.
Proposition 1 below establishes that if a mechanism satisfying the as-
sumptions of Theorem 1 is non-wasteful (i.e., is such that f U n  bX , then it
is (fully) dictatorial. Hence, wastefulness is a property common to all the
mechanisms satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1 that are not (fully)
dictatorial. An argument similar to the one given in the proof of Proposition
1 establishes that if a mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1 is
ecient, then it is dictatorial. (A mechanism f is ecient if for each u 2 U n,
f u  is Pareto optimal with respect to u. Since admissible utility functions
need not be strictly increasing, wastefulness does not imply ineciency.)
Proposition 1. Let U be the set of all the continuous increasing utility functions,
and let f : Un ! X be a strategy-proof and non-wasteful mechanism such thatdf U n  contains three or more outcomes. Then f is dictatorial.
Also it is worth noticing that the mechanism defined in Example 1 is
discontinuous. One can show that if a mechanism satisfying the assumptions
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of Theorem 1 is continuous (in a very weak sense), then it is (fully) dictatorial
(see Moreno [7]).
Theorem 1 rises the question whether one might be able to design
mechanisms that perform better when individuals are known to have pref-
erences representable by continuous and strictly increasing utility functions.
Proposition 2, however, provides a negative answer to this question. Given
an arbitrary set A  <m, denote by A its closure.
Proposition 2. Let _U be the set of all the continuous strictly increasing utility
functions, and let f : _Un ! X be a strategy-proof mechanism such that df  _U n
contains three or more outcomes. Then f is dictatorial.
Note that the cardinality condition is imposed on the of the undominated
closure of the range of f , rather than the undominated range itself. It is easy
to show that whenever f  _Un contains three or more outcomes, then df  _U n
also does.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that when admissible utility functions are
further restricted to be concave, the conclusion of Theorem 1 no longer
holds; as shown in Example 2 below, in this case there are strategy-proof and
non-dictatorial mechanisms. Moreover, the mechanism in Example 2 has
a two-dimensional range; hence the analog of Zhou’s Theorem does not hold
when admissible utility functions are further restricted to be increasing.
Example 2. There are two public goods, and the set of feasible outcomes is
X  x1; x2 2 <2 j x21  x22  1
 	
. Let U be the set of increasing and concave
utility functions. For each u 2 U ; let mu  m1 u ;m2 u   denote the
maximizer of u on X . Consider the mechanism f : Un ! X which for each
u 2 U n, selects
f u  l u ; 1ÿ l u 2
q 
;
where l u  is the ‘‘median’’ of m1 u1 ; . . . ;m1 un . (If n is even, pick an
arbitrary point in 0; 1 and calculate the median adding this point.)
The mechanism f described in Example 2 is not dictatorial on _U n.
Moreover, its range is the set bX , a two dimensional set. It is easy to prove
that this mechanism is also strategy-proof: let i 2 N and u 2 U n be such that
f u 6 mui; then either (1) f1 u0i; u i
ÿ   f1u > m1ui for each u0i 2 U , or
(2) f1 u0i; u i
ÿ   f1u < m1ui for each u0i 2 U ; thus, as ui is increasing and
concave one has
uif u  ui f u0i; u i
ÿ ÿ 
;
for each u0i 2 U . Hence f is strategy-proof.
An important open question is whether one can construct interesting
strategy-proof mechanism (as the one in Example 2) for this domain when
the dimension of the feasible set is greater than two.
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3 Proofs
Let f : U n ! X . We assume throughout that f is a strategy-proof mecha-
nism. For un 2 U let the mechanism f un : U n 1 ! X be given, for each
u n 2 Un 1, by f unu n  f u n; un. Note that each f un is also a strategy-
proof mechanism. For each un 2 U , write Oun  f unU n 1 \ dfU n. Thus,
the correspondence O provides the ‘‘options’’ (i.e., outcomes in the un-
dominated range) that are attainable by individuals 1; . . . ; nÿ 1, given the
utility function reported by Individual n.
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds along the lines of the proof of the
Barbera`-Peleg Theorem. As in their proof, the correspondence O plays
a fundamental role. The strategy of the proof is to show that this corre-
spondence is constant on a certain subdomain, and furthermore that its value
is either a singleton (Individual n’s most preferred outcome) or it is the entire
undominated range of f . Hence either Individual n is a dictator on this
subdomain, or the utility function he reports does not influence the outcome.
It is straightforward to show by induction on the number of individuals that
this implies that f is a dictatorial mechanism on this subdomain. With this
result at hand, one can easily establish Theorem 1.
There are two basic dierences between the proof of B-P’s Theorem and
the proof of Theorem 1. First, option sets as defined here contain only
undominated outcomes, whereas in the proof of B-P’s Theorem options sets
are the sets f unU n 1. Lemma 4 below, however, tells us that whenever all
individuals report a strictly increasing utility function, then the outcome
belongs to the undominated range (i.e., f  _Un  dfU n); this allows one to
show that in this subdomain the correspondence O (as defined here) has the
property mentioned above: it is constant, and it is either a singleton or it is
the entire set dfU n (lemmas 8 and 9). Second, when satiated preferences are
admissible, option sets are shown to be closed; when only monotonic pref-
erences are admissible, however, option sets need not be closed, although
they are shown to be closed relative to dfUn (Lemma 6). It turns out that in
the construction of the proof (specifically, in the proofs of lemmas 8 and 9) it
is only required that one be able to separate out any point in the undomi-
nated range which is not in a given option set from the option set itself (i.e.,
that no point x 2 dfUnnO un  is in the closure of O un ).
Before proving Theorem 1, a number of preliminary results are estab-
lished. Lemma 1 establishes that strategy-proof mechanisms satisfy a modi-
fied version of the strong positive association property. Its proof is omitted
(see Lemma 4.8 in Barbera` and Peleg [2]).
Lemma 1 (MSPAP) For each u  u1; . . . ; un 2 U n, u 2 U and i 2 N such
that for every x 2 f U nn f uf g, ux  uf u implies uix > uif u, one
has f u i; u  f u.
Lemma 2 establishes a standard unanimity property of strategy-proof
mechanisms.
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Lemma 2. (Unanimity) For each u 2 U , f u; . . . ; u maximizes u on f Un.
Proof. Let u 2 U and x 2 f Un, and let u 2 U n be such that f u  x.
Successive applications of strategy-proofness imply
uf u; . . . ; u  uf u; . . . ; u; un      uf u; uÿ1  uf u  ux;
which establishes the lemma. (
Write U  for the set containing the utility functions in U with a unique
maximizer on f Un. Note that the maximizer of each u 2 U on f U n,
denoted by m u , is a member of df U n  . Lemma 3 is a direct implication of
Lemma 2: it establishes that whenever Individual n claims a utility function
un in the set U , then m un  is a member of the set O un .
Lemma 3. For each un 2 U, mun 2 Oun.
In the remaining of the proof, assume that U is the set of all the con-
tinuous increasing utility functions. Lemma 4 establishes, for the domain
under study, that a strategy-proof mechanism must select an outcome indf U n  whenever all individuals report a strictly increasing utility function.
Lemma 4 therefore implies that for each u 2 _Un, one has
f u  f un uÿn  2 Oun.
Lemma 4. For each u 2 _U n, f u  2 df U n  .
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is u  u1; . . . ; un 2 _U n
such that f u 62 df U n  . Write f u  x, and choose a 2 <n such that
u1x  a1  u2x  a2  . . .  unx  an. Consider the utility function u
given for each x 2 <m by
ux  min u1x  a1; . . . ; unx  anf g :
Hence u 2 _U . Moreover, for each x 2 X n xf g, ux  ux implies
uix  uix for each i 2 N . Thus, by slightly bending in the direction of the
main diagonal u’s indierence curve through x, one can obtain a utility
function u 2 _U satisfying for each x 2 X n xf g, that ux  ux implies
uix > uix, for each i 2 N . MSPAP (Lemma 1) yields
x  f u  f u; u2; . . . ; un  . . .  f u; u; . . . ; u; un  f u; u; . . . ; u :
Since x 2 f U nn df U n  there is x0 2 f U n  such that x0 > x, and as u is
a strictly increasing function, one has u x0  > u x   uf u; u; . . . ; u. This
contradicts Lemma 2 and establishes Lemma 4. (
For each x 2 <m, let Ix be the set of indices k 2 1; . . . ;mf g such that
xk > 0.
Lemma 5. If x is a limit point of f U n , then there is x0 2 f U n such that
x0  x.
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Proof. Let x be an arbitrary limit point of f Un, and suppose by way of
contradiction that there is no x0 2 f Un  such that x0  x. Let a 2 <m, a 0,
be such that for each k; k0 2 Ix, akxk  ak0xk0 , and let u 2 U be given, for
each x 2 <m, by ux  min akxk; k 2 Ixf g. Note that u x  > u x  for each
x 2 f U n . Write f u; . . . ; u   ~x. Hence u x  > u ~x . Moreover, as x is a limit
point of f Un , there is x 2 f U n  suciently close to x that u x  > u ~x . This
contradicts Lemma 2, and establishes Lemma 5. (
Lemma 6 establishes that option sets are closed relative to df Un  .
Lemma 6. For each un 2 U , the set Oun is closed relative to df Un  .
Proof. Let un 2 U arbitrary, and let x 2 df U n  be a limit point of Oun. Since
x is a limit point of f un U nÿ1
ÿ 
, Lemma 5 (applied to f un) implies that there is
x0 2 f un Unÿ1ÿ  such that x0  x; since x 2 df U n  , and f un U nÿ1ÿ   f U n , one
has x0  x: (
Lemma 7 establishes that if an outcome is not in the undominated range,
then there is an outcome in the undominated range which contains more of
at least one commodity and no less of any commodity.
Lemma 7. For each x 2 f Unn df Un  , there is x0 2 df Un  such that x0 > x.
Proof. Given x 2 f U nn df U n  , let x0 be an arbitrary maximal point of the
closure of the set x 2 f Un j x  xf g (note that since X is a compact set,
f U n is bounded). If x0 is an isolated point of f Un, then x0 2 df Un  ; if x0 is
a limit point of f U n, then by Lemma 5 there is x00 2 f Un such that
x00  x0; but since there is no point x 2 f U n such that x > x0, then
x0 2 f Un, and therefore x0 2 df U n  . (
Denote by _U the set U  \ _U : Lemma 8 establishes that option sets only
depend on the maximizer of Individual n’s reported utility function.
Lemma 8. For un; u0n 2 _U, mun  mu0n implies Oun  Ou0n.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are un; u0n 2 _U  such that
mun  mu0n  x, and such that there is y 2 OunnOu0n. Let a; a0 2 <m,
a; a0  0, be such that akxk  ak0xk0 for k; k0 2 Ix, and a0kyk  a0k0yk0
for k; k0 2 Iy. Let u; u0 2 U be defined, respectively, by ux 
min akxk; k 2 Ixf g, and u0x  min a0kxk; k 2 Iy
 	
, for each x 2 <m. Note
that mu  x, whereas mu0  y.
It is now shown that there is ~x < y, such that a0k~xk  a0k0~xk0 for k; k0 2 Iy,
and such that there is no x 2 f u0n U nÿ1ÿ  with x  ~x (see Fig. 1).
For each integer q, choose ~x q  such that a0k~xk q   a0k0~xk0 q  for
k; k0 2 Iy, and such that ~x q  ÿ yk k  1q. Thus, the sequence ~x q f g con-
verges to y. Suppose that a point ~x 2 <m with the given properties does not
exist; then form a sequence x q f g, such that for each integer q,
x q  2 f u0n U nÿ1ÿ , and x q   ~x q . Since the sequence x q f g is bounded
(recall that X is compact), a subsequence converges to some point x. Lemma
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5 implies that there is x0 2 f u0n U nÿ1ÿ  such that x0  x. Moreover, since
x q   ~x q , then x0  x  y: Since y 2 df Un  ; and f u0n U nÿ1ÿ   f U n , one
has x0  y. Hence y 2 f u0n U nÿ1ÿ , and therefore y 2 O u0nÿ , which is a con-
tradiction. Thus, a point ~x with the given properties exists.
Now let b > 0 be such that ux  bu0~x, and consider the utility function
u 2 U  given, for each x 2 <m, by ux  max ux; bu0xf g (see Figure 1). The
function u satisfies mu  y, and ux > ux, for each x 2 f u0n Unÿ1ÿ nfxg.
Thus, because x 2 Ou0n by Lemma 3, Lemma 2 implies that f u
0
nu; . . . ; u 
f u; . . . ; u; u0n
ÿ   x. Also as y 2 O un , Lemma 2 implies f unu; . . . ; u 
f u; . . . ; u; un   y. Hence
un f u; . . . ; u; u0n
ÿ ÿ   un x  > un f u; . . . ; u; un  ;
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual n at u; . . . ; u; un . This con-
tradiction establishes Lemma 8. (
Lemma 9 establishes that the correspondence O takes only two possible
values on _U: it can either be the maximizer of Individual n’s reported utility
function, or the entire undominated range.
Lemma 9. For each un 2 _U, either Oun  fmung or Oun  df U n  .
Proof. Suppose not; let un 2 _U , y 2 Ounn munf g, and z 2 df Un nOun. By
Lemma 8 it can be assumed, w.l.o.g., that unz > uny.
Let u 2 U be such that mu  z, and such that y uniquely maximizes
u on f un Unÿ1
ÿ 
(a function with these features can be constructed as in the
proof of Lemma 8). Lemma 2 yields f unu; . . . ; u  f u; . . . ; u; un  y. Also
Lemma 2 implies f u; . . . ; u; u  z. Then
Figure 1
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unf u; . . . ; u; u  unz > uny  unf u; . . . ; u; un;
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual n at u; . . . ; u; un: This con-
tradiction establishes Lemma 9. (
Lemma 10 establishes, for strategy-proof mechanisms satisfying the as-
sumptions of Theorem 1, that the correspondence O is constant on _U .
Lemma 10. Assume that df U n  contains three or more outcomes. If there is
un 2 _U such that Oun  fmung, then for each un 2 _U, one has
Oun  fmung.
Proof. Suppose not; let un; u0n 2 _U  be such Oun  fmung and
Ou0n  df U n  (Lemma 9). Choose x 2 df Un  n mun;mu0n 	; by Lemma 8
it can assumed, w.l.o.g., that u0n m un   > u0n x . Let u 2 U  be such that
m u   x; and consider that sequence f uq; . . . ; uq; u0n
 	
, where
uq x   u x   1=qPmk 1 xk: Since uq; . . . ; uq; u0n 2 _U n; then f uq; . . . ; uq; u0n
2 Ou0n; and therefore one of its subsequences, f uqs ; . . . ; uqs ; u0n
 	
, con-
verges to x. Also f uq; . . . ; uq; unf g  O un   m un f g; i.e., f uq; . . . ; uq; un
 m un  for each q. Since f is strategy-proof one has
u0n f uqs ; . . . ; uqs ; u0n
ÿ   u0n f uqs ; . . . ; uqs ; un   u0n m un  ;
for each qs, and therefore in the limit u0n x   u0n m un  . This contradiction
establishes Lemma 10. (
Proof of Theorem 1: Let f be a mechanism satisfying the assumptions of
Theorem 1. First, it is shown by induction on the number of individuals that
f is dictatorial on  _U n. When n  1, this is an implication of Lemma 2.
Assume that this claim is true for every mechanism for which n  K ÿ 1. It is
shown that the claim holds for n  K.
By Lemma 10, either Oun  fmung for each un 2 _U, or
Oun  df U n  for each un 2 _U . If Oun  fmung for each un 2 _U , then
f u  mun for each u 2  _Un, and therefore Individual n is a dictator for
f on  _U n. If Oun  df U n  for each un 2 _U, then consider the mechanism
f un : U nÿ1 ! X given for each uÿn 2 U nÿ1 by f unuÿn  f uÿn; un. Each f un
is a strategy-proof mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. (It is
easy to see that df un U nÿ1   df U n  : let x 2 df Un  ; because f un Unÿ1ÿ 
 f Un  ; and df un U nÿ1   df U n  ; then x 2 df un Unÿ1 . Let x 2 f U n n df U n  ;
then by Lemma 7 there is x0 2 df Un   df un Unÿ1  such that x0 > x; hence
x 62 df un Unÿ1 :) Thus the induction hypothesis implies that each f un is
dictatorial on  _U nÿ1. It is shown that a single Individual (always the same)
is the dictator for each f un on  _Unÿ1:
Suppose not; w.l.o.g., assume that Individual 1 is the dictator for f un on
 _Unÿ1; and Individual 2 is the dictator for f u0n on  _Unÿ1: Let uÿ 1;2;nf g
2  _U nÿ3 arbitrary, and let u1; u2 2 _U be such that mu1 6 mun; and




nu1; u2; uÿ 1;2;nf g  f u1; u2; uÿ 1;2;nf g; u0n  mun; and therefore f is
manipulable by Individual n at u1; u2; uÿ 1;2;nf g; un: This contradiction es-
tablishes that some Individual i is the dictator for each f un on  _U nÿ1 (i.e.,
for each u 2  _U n; f unuÿn  f u  mui), thereby showing that f is
dictatorial on  _U n:
Assume, w.l.o.g., that Individual 1 is the dictator for f on  _Un: It is
shown that Individual 1 is the dictator for f on _U  _U nÿ1: Suppose not; let
u 2 _U   _U nÿ1 be such that f u 6 m u1 : Then let u 2 _U be such that
u f u  > u m u1  : (A function with this feature can be constructed as
follows: Write f u  x: Let a 2 <m; a 0; be such that akxk  ak0xk0 for
each k 2 I x ; and let u be given for each x 2 <m by u x  
min akxk; k 2 I x f g; let  > 0 be suciently small that for each x 2 f U n ;
k xÿ x k<  implies that ux > umu1; and let x0 < x be such that akx0k 
ak0x0k0 and k x0 ÿ x k< : Define uq x   u x   1q
Pn
k 1 xk; for each x 2 <m;
and let q be an integer suciently large that for each x 2 f U n ; uq x   uq x 
implies x > x0; such integer q exists because f Un   X ; and X is a compact
set. Denote by M uq  the set of maximizers of uq on f Un ; M uq  is non-
empty by Lemma 2. Finally, let x^ 2 M uq ; note that x^ 2 dfU n as uq is a
strictly increasing utility function. By slightly bending uq is indierence curve
through x^ in the direction of the main diagonal, one can construct a utility
function u 2 _U such that m u   x^:) Lemma 2 (applied to f u1 implies
u f u1; u; . . . ; u    u f u  > u m u1  ;
hence f u1; u; . . . ; u  6 m u1 : But notice that u1; u; :::; u  2  _Un; and this
contradicts that Individual 1 is the dictator for f on  _U n:
In order to establish Theorem 1, it must be shown that for each u 2 _U n; f
maximizes u1 on f Un : Suppose not; i.e., let u 2 _Un; and ~x 2 f U n  be such
that u1~x > u1f u: Let ~u 2 _U be such that u1 m ~u   > u1 f u : Since
Individual 1 is the dictator for f on _U  _Unÿ1; one has
u1 f ~u; uÿ1   u1 m ~u   > u1 f u ;
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual 1 at u; contradicting that f is
strategy-proof and establishing Theorem 1. (
Lemma 11 establishes that a strategy-proof mechanism f satisfying the
assumptions of Theorem 1 must always select outcomes that are less than or
equal to the most preferred bundle of the dictator for f on _U n. This property
will be useful in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 11. If f is a mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1, then
there is i 2 N such that for each ui; uÿi 2 U   U nÿ1; f ui; uÿi  mui:
Proof. Assume, w.l.o.g., that Individual 1 is the dictator for f on _U n
(Theorem 1). It is shown that Lemma 11 holds for i  1: Suppose not;
let u1; uÿ1 2 U   U nÿ1 and suppose that it is not the case that
f u1; uÿ1  mu1: Let u 2 _U be such that uf u1; uÿ1 > umu1: Since
f u1; uÿ1 2 f u1;U nÿ1; Lemma 2 (applied to f u1 ) yields
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uf u1; u; . . . ; u  uf u1; u 1:
Hence f u1; u; . . . ; u 6 mu1:
Let q be a suciently large integer that uq1 x   u1 x   1q
Pm
k 1 xk satisfies
that for each x 2 f Un ; uq1 x   uq1 m u1   implies u1 x  > u1 f u1; u; :::; u 
(recall that X  f Un  is a compact set). Since uq1; u; :::; u 2 _U n, and Indi-
vidual 1 is the dictator for f on _U n; then one has uq1 f uq1; u; :::;
ÿ
u 
uq1 m u1  : Hence
u1f uq1; u; :::; u > u1f u1; u; :::; u;
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual 1 at u1; u; :::; u; which con-
tradicts that f is strategy-proof and proves the lemma. (
Now Proposition 1 can be easily proved.
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume, w.l.o.g., that Lemma 11 is satisfied for i  1:
It is shown that Individual 1 is a dictator for f : Suppose not; let u 2 U n and
x 2 f U n be such that u1x > u1f u: By Lemma 7 it can be assumed
w.l.o.g. that x 2 df Un  : Hence let u01 2 U  be such that mu01  x: Lemma 11
yields f u01; u 1  x; moreover, f u01; u 1 2 df U n  as f is non-wasteful.
Hence f u01; u 1  x: This implies, however, that f is manipulable by Indi-
vidual 1 at u, contradicting that f is strategy-proof. Hence Individual 1 is
a dictator for f on Un; and therefore f is dictatorial. (
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that _U is the set of all the continuous strictly
increasing utility functions, and let f : _U n ! X be a strategy-proof mecha-
nism such that
d
f  _Un contains three or more outcomes. Write U for the set
of all the continuous increasing utility functions. Proposition 2 is proved by
showing that f can be extended to a mechanism F : Un ! X satisfying the
assumptions of Theorem 1. The mechanism F will therefore be dictatorial on
_U n by Theorem 1, and as F coincides with f on _Un; then f is (fully)
dictatorial.
The mechanism F  F n is defined recursively as follows: F 0  f ; and
F i : Ui  _Un i ! X ; is given by
F i u   F
i 1 u  if u 2Ui 1  _U n i1
r Mi u   otherwise,

where r is an arbitrary selection on X , and Mi u   Mni u  is defined by
letting M0i u  be the set of maximizers of ui on F i 1 _U ; u i
ÿ 
(a nonempty
compact set), and Mji u  be the set of maximizers of uj on Mj 1i u ; for
j  1; . . . ; n: Note that for each u 2 _Un; F u   f u :
In order to show that F is strategy-proof, it is shown by induction that
every mechanism F 0; F 1; . . . ; F n is strategy-proof. Clearly F 0 is strategy-
proof. Assuming that F 0; . . . ; F i 1 are strategy-proof, we must show that F i
is strategy-proof also.
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It is easy to show that F i is not manipulable by Individual i, for if there is
u 2 U i  _U n i and u0i 2 U such that ui F i u   < ui F i u0i; u i
ÿ ÿ 
; then because
ui is continuous and F i u0i; u i
ÿ  2 F i 1 _U ; u iÿ ; there is u0i 2 _U such that
F i 1 u0i; u i
ÿ 
is suciently close to F i u0i; u i
ÿ 
that ui F i u   < ui
F i 1 u0i; u i
ÿ ÿ 
; this contradicts that F i u  is a maximizer of ui on
F i 1 _U ; u i
ÿ 
:
Suppose by way of contradiction that Individual j 2 Nn if g can manip-
ulate F i at u; i.e., there is an admissible u0j such that ujF iu < ujF i
u j; u0j: Write F i
ÿ
u j; u0j







   Oÿu0j: By the definition of F i, we have x 62 Mji u :
Suppose that x 2 Oÿuj; then there is j 2 f1; . . . ; jÿ 1g [ fig such that








; and as uj0 y   uj0 x  for j0 2 f1; . . . ; jÿ 1g [ fig;
one must have y 62 Oÿu0j: Therefore either
2:1 y 62 Oÿu0j; or
2:2 x 62 O uj
ÿ 
:
We show that 2:1  implies that F i 1 is manipulable by Individual j;
leading to a contradiction as F i 1 is strategy proof by the induction hy-







the definition of u given below, an identical argument shows that 2:2  also
leads to a contradiction.
Let u 2 U be such that y is its unique maximizer on f  _Un; and such that
u x  > u x0 ; for each x0 2 Ou0jnfxg: (As f _Un
ÿ   df _U nÿ  by Lemma 4, a
utility function with these features can be constructed as in the proof Lem-
ma 8 under (1.1).) For each integer q define the utility function uq by
uq x   u x   1q
Pm




uq; u fi;jg; u0j
	




uqs ; u fi;jg; u0j
	
; because F i 1 is
strategy-proof, the limit of this subsequence can only be x: Also the sequence
F i 1 uqs ; u i 
 	  Ouj or one of its subsequences converges to y: As F i 1 is
strategy-proof, for each integer qs one has
uj F i 1 uqs ; u i 
ÿ   uj F i 1 uqs ; u i;jf g; u0j  ;
and therefore in the limit uj y   uj x ; which is a contradiction.
Thus, F is strategy-proof. Moreover, by the definition of F and Lemma 2,
F Un   f  _U n; and therefore F satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1. (
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